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Spencer
t

Yini Zhang
Introduction

On August 21, 2013, Judge Denise Lind sentenced Army
intelligence analyst Bradley Manning to thirty-five years in
prison,1 thus ending the federal government's three-year
prosecution of the individual behind one of the largest classified
information leaks in U.S. history.2 The next day, Manning made
headlines again-not for the conviction, but for a statement read
by Manning's lawyer on The Today Show.
In that short
statement, Manning announced: "I want everyone to know the

t. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2016. Many thanks to
the editors and staff of Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practicefor all
the time and work put into reviewing and editing this Comment. Special thanks to
Professor June Carbone for her guidance and suggestions throughout this process.
Finally, thank you to my parents for teaching me the power of the written word.
1. Julie Tate, Bradley Manning Sentenced to 35 Years in WikiLeaks Case,
WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/judge-to-sentence-bradley-manning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-1 1e3b87c-476db8ac34cd story.html.
2. Id. Manning was arrested in May 2010 in Iraq. See Kevin Poulsen & Kim
Zetter, U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in Wikileaks Video Probe, WIRED (June 6,
2010, 9:31 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/06/leak/.
3. Scott Stump, Bradley Manning: I Want To Live as a Woman, TODAY (Aug.
22, 2013, 6:35 AM), http://www.today.com/news/bradley-manning-i-want-livewoman-6C10974915; see also Adam Gabbatt, 'IAm Chelsea Manning,' Says Jailed
Soldier Formerly Known as Bradley, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:35 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/bradley-manning-woman-chelsea-g
ender-reassignment; Emmarie Huetteman, 'I Am a Female,' Manning Announces,
Asking Army for Hormone Therapy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013, at A17. Although
Manning is still biologically male, see Kristin Hulaas Sunde, Whistleblower Chelsea
Manning Thanks Amnesty Activists for Their Support, AMNESTY INT'L (Apr. 8,
2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/04/whistleblower-chelsea
-manning-thanks- amnesty-activists-for-their-support/, this Comment will refer to
Manning and all transgender individuals by how each person self-identifies.
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real me. I am Chelsea Manning. I am a female. 4 Since that
announcement, Manning's pursuit of medical treatment for her
gender dysphoria (GD) has increased the public's awareness of
that "condition"' and of the uphill battle fought by inmates to
receive relevant medical care.6
4. '1Am Chelsea: Read Manning'sFull Statement, TODAY (Aug. 22, 2013, 6:35
AM), http://www.today.com/news/i-am-chelsea-read-mannings-full-statement-6C10
974052 [hereinafter 'IAm Chelsea].
5. Both the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5],
and the World Health Organization's INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION
OF DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS (10th ed. 1992) [hereinafter ICD-10],
classify gender dysphoria (GD) as a medical condition or illness. However, the use
of such terminology is debated in transgender, gender activist, and clinical
communities. See Alice Dreger, Why Gender Dysphoria Should No Longer Be
Considered a Medical Disorder, PAC.
STANDARD
(Oct.
18,
2013),
http://www.psmag.com/health-and-behavior/take-gender-identity-disorder-dsm-683
08. But if GD is not classified as a medical condition, the Eighth Amendment likely
does not apply-at least in terms of providing individuals access to medical
treatment, under which hormone therapy and psychotherapy fall. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. Notably, the APA, in a fact sheet about GD, states: "It is important
to note that gender nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder. The critical
element of gender dysphoria is the presence of clinically significant distress
associated with the condition." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, GENDER DYSPHORIA
FACTSHEET 1 (2013), http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%/o20dysphoria%/o20fact
%20sheet.pdf.
6. In the statement released on August 22, 2013, Manning wrote: "I want to
begin hormone therapy as soon as possible." 'IAm Chelsea,' supra note 4. In April
2014, a Kansas judge granted Manning's petition to change her name to Chelsea
Elizabeth Manning. Ernesto Londofio, Convicted Leaker Bradley Manning Changes
Legal Name to Chelsea Elizabeth Manning, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/convicted-leaker-bradley-m
anning-changes-legal-name-to-chelsea-elizabeth-manning/2014/04/23/e2a96546-cb 1
c-1le3-a75e-463587891b57 story.html [hereinafter Convicted Leaker Bradley
Manning]. An Army spokesperson stated that Manning's records will be altered to
reflect the name change but that the order would have no effect on Manning's
recognized sex. Id. In July 2014, the Bureau of Prisons denied the Army's request
to transfer Manning to a civilian facility for better GD treatment; in response, the
military began preparations to provide Manning with initial treatments.
Manning's Gender Treatments To Be Begun by the Military, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/us/politics/mannings-gendertreatments-to-be-begun-by-the-military.html. However, in a statement released on
August 22, 2014, Manning claimed that the U.S. Department of Defense had failed
to provide the promised treatment. Jessica Glenza, Chelsea Manning Says She Is
Being Denied Gender-Reassignment Treatment, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2014, 11:09
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/chelsea-manning-denied-gend
er-reassignment-treatment. Manning filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia on September 23, 2014, alleging that the military's denial of
medical treatment for her GD violated her constitutional rights under the Eighth
Amendment. Manning v. Hagel, No. 1:14-CV-01609, 2014 WL 4721671, at *2
(D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2014); see Bill Mears, Chelsea Manning Sues To Get Transgender
Medical Treatment, CNN (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/23/
justice/chelsea-manning-lawsuit. In February 2015, the Army approved hormone
therapy for Manning. Chelsea Manning's Hormone Therapy Approved by US Army,
BBC, (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-31459921.
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When the television show Orange Is the New Black premiered
weeks before Manning's statement, Laverne Cox's portrayal of
Sophia Burset captured the public's attention.7 In the show's first
season, Burset, a male-to-female (MTF) transgender inmate, is
denied hormone treatment due to the prison's budget cutbacks and
frequently struggles with inadequate medical care.'
Cox, a
transgender woman, has been credited with shining a spotlight on
transgender issues and catalyzing the public conversation about
the "T in LGBT."9 Cox's advocacy for transgender rights and her
portrayal of Burset led to her being the first transgender person to
appear on the cover of Time Magazine and the first transgender
person to receive an Emmy nomination.1"
Cox and Manning did not only increase the public's
awareness of transgender issues, but they also highlighted the
struggles faced by transgender inmates. According to one study,
16% of transgender individuals have been incarcerated at some
point in their lives, compared to only 2.7% of the general
population." The disparity in incarceration rates is even greater
for African American (47%) and American Indian (30%)
transgender individuals.1 2 In addition, 7% of survey respondents
alleged that they were incarcerated solely because of police officer
bias against
transgender and gender-nonconforming (TGNC)
1 3
individuals.
7. Dylan Matthews, 'Orange Is the New Black' Is the Best Show About Prison
Ever Made, WASH. POST (July 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/won
kblog/wp/2013/07/17/orange-is-the-new-black-is-the-best-tv-show-about-prison-evermade/; Alyssa Rosenberg, Why Laverne Cox of "OrangeIs the New Black" Is a Star,
WASH. POST (June 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/
wp/2014/06/06/why-laverne-cox-of-orange-is-the-new-black-is-a-star.
8. Arin Andrews, Why Laverne Cox's Emmy Nomination Matters, VOGUE (Aug.
23, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.vogue.com/988955/laverne-cox-emmy-nomination.
9. Jonathan Capehart, Time To Talk About the T in LGBT, WASH. POST (June
2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2014/06/02/timeto-talk-about-the-t-in-lgbt/ (noting that most people are unfamiliar with
transgender issues but that more people are learning about them).
10. Andrews, supra note 8.
11. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT'L TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY,
INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 163 (2001), http://www.endtransdiscrimination.org/PDFs/
NTDS Report.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Id. It is important to note that "transgender" and "gender-nonconforming"
are not synonymous terms. GLAAD Media Reference Guide-TransgenderIssues,
GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited Jan. 10, 2015).
To wit:
Gender nonconformity refers to the extent to which a person's gender
identity, role, or expression differs from the cultural norms prescribed for
people of a particular sex. Gender dysphoria refers to discomfort or
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In addition, while incarcerated, 35% of respondents reported
harassment by other inmates, and 37% reported harassment by
correctional officers and/or staff. 14
Sixteen percent of the
respondents who had been incarcerated reported that they were
the victims of physical assaults, and 15% experienced sexual
assault perpetrated by other inmates and/or staff. 15 The survey
also found that MTF persons were more likely than female-to-male
(FTM) transgender
individuals to be victims of both physical and
16
sexual assaults.

distress that is caused by a discrepancy between a person's gender identity
and that person's sex assigned at birth (and the associated gender role
and/or primary and secondary sex characteristics). Only some gendernonconforming people experience gender dysphoria at some point in their
lives.
Eli Coleman et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender,
and Gender-Nonconforming People, Version 7, 13 INT'L J. TRANSGENDERISM 165,
168 (2011) (citations omitted). The treatment of gender nonconforming inmates is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
14. GRANT ETAL., supra note 11, at 166.
15. Id. at 167. One study that surveyed inmates at twelve (adult) men's prisons
found that nearly 32% of inmates had reported at least one physical assault, and
approximately 3% had reported at least one sexual assault. Nancy Wolff & Jing
Shi, Contextualization of Physical and Sexual Assault in Male Prisons: Incidents
and Their Aftermath, 15 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 58, 64 (2009). The
Department of Justice (DOJ) recently released the results of a two-year study on
the rates of sexual victimization of inmates at various correctional facilities
nationwide. ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES 2011-12 (2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjrill12.pdf. The report estimated that 4% of
state and federal prison inmates, and 3.2% of jail inmates, experienced at least one
incident of sexual victimization by another inmate or by facility staff. Id. at 7.
Further, the DOJ report found that 34.6% transgender inmates in state and federal
prisons and 34% of transgender inmates in jails were victims of at least one such
incident. ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES:
PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION AMONG TRANSGENDER ADULT INMATES 9
tbl.1 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112 st.pdf. It is clear from
the DOJ report that transgender inmates are more susceptible to sexual
victimization. See id.
16. GRANT ET AL., supra note 11, at 167. Twenty-one percent of MTF survey
participants reported being physically assaulted, whereas only 11% of FTM
individuals experienced such assaults. Id. at 163. Twenty percent of MTF
individuals and 6% of FTM individuals reported sexual assaults. Id. at 167. A
number of factors may account for this difference. First, federal authorities
generally incarcerate preoperative transgender inmates according to biological sex.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). Therefore, MTF inmates,
regardless of their physical characteristics, are often placed in male facilities.
LAMBDA LEGAL, TRANSGENDER INCARCERATED PEOPLE IN CRISIS 1 (2015),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/2015 transge
nder-incarcerated-people-in-crisis-fs-v5-singlepages.pdf.
Other studies have
discovered trends in the physical characteristics of male inmates targeted for
sexual assault. For example, such victims are more likely to be smaller in stature
or have more feminine features than their attackers. Wolff & Shi, supra note 15, at
60. For a summary of several of these studies, see id. at 59.
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The survey further showed that correctional facilities fail to
provide proper medical care to many TGNC inmates. 17 Twelve
percent of respondents reported that they were denied routine18
medical treatment because of biases against TGNC individuals,
and 17% reported that they were refused hormone treatments. 19
As the survey results demonstrate, correctional facilities have
denied-and continue to deny-transgender inmates the medical
care their physicians and 2 other medical professionals deem
necessary to their well-being. 1
But courts have only recently started to take an active role in
recognizing and protecting the rights of transgender inmates.21
While Cox and Manning catapulted transgender issues onto the
national stage, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts quietly expanded the access of transgender
inmates to medically necessary treatment.22 In Kosilek v. Spencer
(Kosilek 11), the district court and a three-judge panel of the First
Circuit laid the groundwork for the country's first state-funded
inmate sex reassignment surgery (SRS). 23 But the First Circuit,
after rehearing the case en banc, reversed the decision.
Michelle
Kosilek's battle, which spanned two decades, exemplifies the
process many transgender inmates must contend with to receive
adequate medical treatment for gender dysphoria. 5
Part I of this Comment briefly reviews the history of medical
treatment for inmates, of GD treatment in general, and of GD
treatment for transgender inmates. Part 11 provides background
information on Michelle Kosilek and her conviction and outlines
the procedural history of Kosilek

12'

and Kosilek I.

27

Part III

17. See GRANT ETAL., supra note 11, at 169.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 16.
21. Federal courts of appeal have consistently recognized GD as a serious
medical condition. See id. at 2. For a discussion of the judiciary's role in shaping
transgender inmates' access to medical care for GD, see infra Part I.
22. Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek HlDistrict Court), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass.
2012), aff'd, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
23. Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek HI First Circuit), 740 F.3d 733, 773 (1st Cir.
2014), re'den banc, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015)
(mem.).
24. Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek lIEn Banc), 774 F.3d 63, 96 (1st Cir. 2014) (en
banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
25. Id. For a discussion of the lawsuits Kosilek filed, see infra Part 11.
26. Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek 1), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass 2002). Kosilek
filed two lawsuits in 1992: Kosilek , 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, and Kosilek v. Nelson,
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discusses both First Circuit decisions in Kosilek II. Part IV
examines how the Eighth Amendment applies to medical
treatment provided to inmates with GD, specifically within the
context of the evolving jurisprudence on what constitutes "cruel
and unusual punishment., 28 Finally, the Conclusion emphasizes
the importance of Kosilek II in light of the mistreatment suffered
by inmates with GD and the continued callousness towards
transgender inmates' serious medical needs by the corrections
system.
Ultimately, this Comment will argue that depriving
transgender inmates of medically necessary treatments is nothing
short of cruel and unusual punishment and fits into the developing
concept of what constitutes prohibited treatment of inmates under
the Eighth Amendment.
I.

The Rights of Inmates to Medical Treatment, Medical
Treatment for Gender Dysphoria, and Access to Medical
Treatment for Transgender Inmates
A.

Medical Treatment for IncarceratedIndividuals

In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, the
Supreme Court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) applies to correctional facilities. 29 However, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12211(b) states: "Under this chapter, the term 'disability' shall
not
include ... transvestism,
transsexualism,
pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting
from
physical
impairments,
or
other sexual
behavior
disorders... ."' As a result, the Eighth Amendment has been
crucial to securing adequate medical care for inmates with gender
dysphora.

No. C.A.92-12820-MLW, 2000 WL 1346898 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2000). Because the
latter was dismissed, in this Comment, Kosilek I refers only to the former lawsuit.
27. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d 733.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V111.
29. Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998) (citing Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12141).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2015). While the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
expanded the definition of "disability," Congress retained the GD exclusion from
the original statute. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008). The
language and structure of the ADA categorize transgender persons with pedophiles
and other "sexual behavior disorders." 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b). For a discussion of
Congress's continuous denial of ADA protection for transgender individuals, see
Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for
TransgenderPeople, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2014).
31. LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 16, at 2.
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In the 1976 landmark case Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment requires the government to provide
medical care for inmates. 32 In so holding, the Court stated:
An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical
needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be
met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce
physical "torture or a lingering death".... In less serious
cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering
33
which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.
Furthermore, the inmate's resultant suffering may have
significant consequences:
"Deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.3 4
In Brown v. Plata, the Court continued to expand on the
importance of inmates' medical care and stated that "[a] prison
that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate
medical care, is incompatible with the
concept of human dignity
''
and has no place in civilized society. 3
In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, an
inmate must show more than that he or she received inadequate
medical care.3 6 Rather, to state a cause of action, the inmate must
demonstrate "deliberate indifference" on the part of prison
officials.
This deliberate indifference test has two prongs: one
objective and one subjective.3 Therefore, to satisfy the objective
prong, the inmate must show that the harm suffered was
objectively sufficient to comprise a constitutional violation.3 9 The
subjective prong requires the inmate to prove that the prison
officials acted "with a sufficiently culpable state of mind., 40 To
satisfy the two-prong test in cases alleging failure to provide
medical treatment, the inmate must show (1) that he or she had a

32. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1976).
33. Id. at 103 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
35. Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
36. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
37. Id.
38. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 298 (1991)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 21.
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medical need that, if left untreated, would cause serious harm, and
(2) that prison officials knew that the prisoner had a high risk of
harm if untreated.41
B.

Medical Treatment for Gender Dysphoria

The medical profession has been historically slow to recognize
and accept GD,42 but various medical professional associations,
and both the fifth edition of the Diagnosticand StatisticalManual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)43 and the tenth edition of the
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (ICD-I0), recognize it as a medical condition.
In
2013, the DSM-5 changed its official diagnosis from "gender

41. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
In Farmer, a MTF
transgender inmate who had undergone some treatments for gender dysphoria
prior to incarceration was placed in the general male population of a federal prison.
Id. The inmate alleged that, within two weeks, a fellow prisoner physically and
sexually assaulted her. Id. In discussing the elements of an Eighth Amendment
claim, Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
Our cases have held that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment
only when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must
be, objectively, "sufficiently serious," a prison official's act or omission
must result in the denial of "the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities." ... The second requirement follows from the principle that
"only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth
Amendment." To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a
prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." In prisonconditions cases that state of mind is one of "deliberate indifference" to
inmate health or safety ....
Id. (citations omitted). See also Kosilek II District Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 20607 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 774 F.3d 63
(1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
42. John M. Ohle, Constructing the Trannie: Transgender People and the Law,
8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 237, 252 (2004). Ohle discusses what he terms the
"medicalization of the transgender individual" and the benefits and disadvantages
of classifying GD as a medical disorder. Id. at 271. While classifying GD as a
medical condition permits transgender individuals to seek medical care, it also
designates them as sick or diseased. Id. A discussion of whether GD should be
categorized as a medical condition or illness, and the legal consequences of doing
so, is beyond the scope of this Comment. The transgender inmates discussed in
this Comment have generally been diagnosed with GD and have sought medical
treatments such as hormone therapy or SRS. Because the jurisprudence has
evolved to view GD as a medical condition for which inmates can receive
treatment-perhaps the only way to secure treatment-this Comment refers to GD
as a medical condition.
43. DSM-5, supra note 5, at 451-59 (recognizing GD for the first time).
44. ICD-10, supra note 5, at 311-87. While many countries quickly adopted the
ICD-10, the United States delayed the transition from the ICD-9 until October 1,
2015. See Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-93, § 212, 128
Stat. 1040, 1047 (2014).
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identity disorder" to "gender dysphoria."4 Along with the change
in labeling came an important shift in the focus of the diagnosis. 46
The previous edition of the book, the DSM-IV-TR, 4' emphasized
the dissonance in gender identity that individuals with GD
experience as a result of the incongruity between his or her birth
gender and how he or she identifies. 4 The DSM-5, on the other
hand, emphasizes the distress experienced by individuals because
of that incongruity. 49 The new diagnostic class of "gender
dysphoria" eliminates the previous emphasis on cross-gender
identification, and, further, it acknowledges that GD is "a unique
condition in that it is a diagnosis made by mental health care
providers, although a large proportion of the treatment is
endocrinological and surgical ... ."" The ICD-10 refers to the
condition as "gender identity disorder" (GID), 1 a term that
encompasses the diagnoses of "transsexualism"; 2 "dual-role
transvestism"; 3 "gender identity disorder of childhood"; 4 "other
gender identity disorders";
and "gender identity disorder,
unspecified. 5 6

45. Compare DSM-5, supra note 43, at 451-59 (stating that people whose
gender at birth is the opposite of the one with which they identify are diagnosed
with "gender dysphoria"), with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 576 (4th ed. text rev. 2000)
[hereinafter DSM-IV-TR] (identifying "gender identity disorder" as the diagnostic
name associated with individuals who desire to be a different gender from their
assigned gender).
46. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-TV-TR TO
DSM-5, at 14-15, http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/changes / 20from / 20dsm-ivtr%20to%20dsm-5.pdf [hereinafter APA, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-IVTR TO DSM-5]; see also Wynne Parry, Gender Dysphoria:DSM-5 Reflects Shift in
Perspective on Gender Identity, HUFFINGTON POST (updated Aug. 4, 2013, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/gender-dysphoria-dsm-5 n 3385287.html
(discussing the DSM-5 changes).
47. DSM-TV-TR, supra note 45.
48. APA, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-IV-TR TO DSM-5, supra note 46,
at 14-15.
49. Parry, supranote 46.
50. APA, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-IV-TR TO DSM-5, supra note 46,
at 14.
51. ICD-10, supra note 44, § F64. This Comment will refer to the condition as
both gender dysphoria and gender identity disorder since both are medically
recognized diagnoses.
52. Id. § F64.0.
53. Id. § F64.1.
54. Id. § F64.2.
55. Id. § F64.8.
56. Id. § F64.9.
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While treatment plans are tailored to each individual, most of
the medical community in the United States has adopted accepted
standards of care (SOC).1 7 The SOC are flexible and can be
modified to meet each individual patient's diverse needs.5, First
and foremost, the goal of any treatment for GD is to support the
individual's decisions about physical modifications to his or her
body. 9 Psychological and medical treatments for GD include
psychotherapy, hormone treatment, and SRS.6" In addition, the
SOC advocate for social support, such as through peer-support
groups, and for changes in gender expression, including name
changes and hair removal through electrolysis.61
For some transgender individuals, SRS is a medically
necessary treatment. 2 Healthcare professionals and the SOC
recognize that, for some, "relief from gender dysphoria cannot be
achieved without modification of their primary and/or secondary
sex characteristics to establish greater congruence with their
gender identity.6 13 SRS can therefore provide some of these
individuals with comfort and a greater sense of ease.6 4 The SOC
outline a number of requirements that an individual must meet
before SRS can be considered 5 -for example, for genital surgery,
the SOC recommend twelve months of continuous hormone
therapy and twelve months of living as the gender congruent with
the individual's identity.66
C. A History of Medical Treatments for GD Available to
TransgenderInmates
Historically, transgender inmates have been denied medical
treatment for GD.6 For example, in 2010, the Wisconsin state
legislature banned hormone therapy and SRS for inmates. 8 State

57. Coleman et al., supra note 13, at 166.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 199.
60. Id. at 171.
61. Id. at 171-72.
62. Id. at 199.
63. Id.
64. Studies have demonstrated the positive effects (e.g., increased subjective
well-being) of SRS in post-operative outcomes. Id.
65. Id. at 201-03.
66. Id. at 202.
67. LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 31.
68. Inmate Sex Change Prevention Act, WIS. STAT. § 302.386(5m) (2010).
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legislatures are not alone in denying transgender inmates medical
care for GD: Federal and state courts have also consistently
denied such care under the Eighth Amendment."
In Heard v. Franzen, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois rejected an inmate's request for SRS
and entered judgment for the director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections ("IDOC"). 9 The court held that an inmate's desire for
SRS was not a serious disease or injury under the Eighth
Amendment.71 Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that serious medical harm would result from
the refusal, and, therefore, that the inmate failed to meet the
objective prong of the deliberate indifference test. 2 Because the
court determined that a vaginectomy was not medically necessary,
the IDOC's discretion to determine an inmate's medical treatment
trumped the desires of the inmate. 3 In any case, it was IDOC
policy to prohibit SRS for inmates. 4
Heard is just one of many cases that have denied transgender
individuals adequate medical care for their gender dysphoria. The
Seventh Circuit held in Maggert v. Hanks that, when a prison
psychiatrist did not diagnose an inmate with GD, the prison's
refusal to provide hormone therapy did not violate the Eighth
Amendment.
Although the court stated that GD was a serious
psychiatric disorder, it concluded: "[I]t does not follow that the
prisons have a duty to authorize the hormonal and surgical
procedures that in most cases at least would be necessary to 'cure'

a prisoner's gender dysphoria."' 6 Likewise, in Long v. Nix, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa held that,
although the plaintiff inmate was diagnosed with GID, the
disorder did not constitute a serious medical need, and the prison's
denial of hormone therapy and feminine clothing did not violate

69. See, e.g., B.C. v. Estes, No. 5:13-cv-00344-KOB-JHE, 2014 WL 4415975
(N.D. Ala. July 23, 2014); Smith v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 2010 WL 4008172 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 27, 2010).
70. Heard v. Franzen, No. 80 C 467, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11909, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. June 12, 1980). The inmate, scheduled to undergo a medically necessary
hysterectomy, requested a vaginectomy based on a longstanding desire for SRS. Id.
at *1-*2. The inmate's physician stated that it would be safer to perform both
procedures at the same time, but the Illinois Department of Corrections rejected
the request. Id. at *1.
71. Id. at *1-*3.
72. Id. at *4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997).
76. Id. at 671.
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Long's Eighth Amendment rights." Other courts have also held
that inmates do not have a constitutional right to hormone
therapy where it is not medically necessary. 71
However, courts have increasingly acknowledged that GD is
a serious medical or psychiatric condition. 1 Some courts have held
that medical treatment for GD is necessary and that the denial of
treatment can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. 8
Courts have found this to be especially true in cases where the
inmate engaged in self-mutilation and attempted suicide because
of his or her lack of medical treatment for GD.81 In addition, in
Fields v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit held that Wisconsin's state
law prohibiting hormone therapy and SRS violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 82
After establishing that GD is a serious medical condition, the court
in Fields stated: "Surely, had the Wisconsin legislature passed a
77. Long v. Nix, 877 F. Supp. 1358, 1365-66 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 761
(8th Cir. 1996); see also White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 324, 327-28 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a transgender inmate has no right to wear cosmetics or "cross-dress").
78. E.g., Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987); Supre v.
Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1986); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351,
353-54 (D. Kan. 1986).
79. See Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671 (classifying gender dysphoria as a "serious
psychiatric disorder"); Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 413 (holding that "transsexualism"
is a serious medical need); Supre, 792 F.2d at 963 (holding that, while the plaintiff
did not have a right to hormone treatment, some form of treatment should be
provided); Lamb, 633 F. Supp. at 354 (stating that the inmate's psychological
treatment for GD was sufficient); see also GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFS.,
TRANSGENDER
LEGAL
ISSUES
IN
NEW
ENGLAND
25-26
(2005),
http://www.masstpc.org/pubs/Transgender Legal Issues.pdf.
80. See, e.g., Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252 (D. Mass. 2012)
(holding that the Department of Corrections violated an inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights where the inmate was diagnosed with GID by a medical
professional, the disorder was likely to lead to serious harm if untreated, and
treatment was delayed and inconsistent); Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 731 F.
Supp. 792, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the inmate satisfied both the objective and subjective prongs of the deliberate
indifference test and that denial of treatment for the inmate's gender dysphoria
deprived the inmate of a constitutional right); see also De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330
F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that GD constitutes a serious medical need
where the individual engages in self-mutilation, triggering Eighth Amendment
rights).
81. De'Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634; Adams v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 716 F. Supp.
2d 107, 111 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that prison officials may not be deliberately
indifferent to GD where the inmate attempted suicide and self-castration multiple
times during a four-year period and requested evaluation and treatment for GD
multiple times); Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 907 (E.D. Wis. 2010)
(holding that a reasonable jury could find that real-life experience, as recommended
by the SOC, was appropriate for the inmate because a physician believed that
refusing the treatment would put the inmate at risk for self-harm and selfcastration).
82. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011).
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law that DOC inmates with cancer must be treated only with
therapy and pain killers, this court would have no trouble
concluding that the law was unconstitutional."83 Keeping in line
with the existing case law, the district court's decision in Kosilek II
represented the next logical step in providing adequate treatment
for inmates with GD.
IL The Factual Background and Procedural History of
Kosilek v. Spencer
Michelle Kosilek, who was born Robert Kosilek, suffers from
GD.84 Since the age of three, Kosilek has believed that she is a
woman trapped inside a male body."
When she was three,
Kosilek's mother left her in an orphanage, where she was abused
for her attempts to dress as a girl. 6 After she returned to her
mother's custody at the age of ten, her grandfather repeatedly
raped her, and her stepfather stabbed her because of her
expressed desire to live as a girl. 7 She ran away from home as a
teenager and engaged in drug use and prostitution.8
She
frequently dressed as a woman and received female hormones
from various sources. 9 After she was assaulted several times,
Kosilek ceased using hormones.9" Despite her history of substance
abuse, incarceration, prostitution, and physical altercations,
Kosilek earned a college degree and held various jobs. 1 While
receiving treatment for drug abuse, Kosilek met Cheryl McCaul, a
volunteer counselor at a drug rehabilitation center.12 McCaul
believed that she could "cure" Kosilek's GD because Kosilek just
needed "a good woman," and the two married. 3

83. Id. at 556.
84. Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek 1), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D. Mass. 2002).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 163.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Kosilek developed breasts while on female hormones and was gang
raped as a result while incarcerated in Chicago. Id. She was later assaulted by
two men outside a gay bar. Id.
91. Id. at 163-64.
92. Id. at 164.
93. Id.
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In 1990, Kosilek murdered McCaul.9 4 Kosilek was convicted
in 199295 and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of parole. 96 While she awaited trial, Kosilek illegally obtained
female hormones from a guard.9 7 She also repeatedly self-harmed:
She attempted suicide twice,98 and she tried to castrate herself.9
Upon her conviction, Kosilek was placed under the responsibility
of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections ("MDOC") in a
medium-security men's prison.1 0
While incarcerated, Kosilek
changed her name to Michelle.1"1 She
10 2 now lives her life as a
woman to the greatest extent possible.
A.

Kosilek I: The FightBegins

In 1992, Kosilek filed a complaint against MDOC alleging
that it had violated her Eighth Amendment rights by denying her
adequate medical care to evaluate her GD. 10 3 A MDOC-retained
specialist examined Kosilek for her severe GD 10 4 and recommended
five action items: (1) that she should receive psychotherapy from a
qualified therapist; (2) that she should receive female hormones;
(3) that she should consult with a surgeon about SRS; (4) that she
should be subject to psychiatric monitoring; and (5) that she
should be given access to female personal care products, such as
makeup. 105

94. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d 733, 738 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 774
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
95. Id.
96. Kosilek , 221 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
97. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 738.
98. Id. One attempt occurred while Kosilek was taking antidepressants. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Kosilek L, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D. Mass. 2002).
104. Id. at 168. The specialist, Dr. Marshall Forstein, was employed because of
the litigation, and his recommendations were not the focus of MDOC's
considerations in treating Kosilek. Id.
105. Id. The recommendations were consistent with the SOC. Id. at 158-59.
The SOC referenced by the court in both Kosilek I and Kosilek II are found in
Walter Meyer III et al., Harry Benjamin Int'l Gender Dysphoria Ass'n, Standards
of Care for Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth Version, 13 J. PSYCHOL. & HUM.
SEXUALITY 1 (2001).
The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria
Association later became the World Professional Association for Transgender
Health. Kosilek II First Circuit, 740 F.3d at 739 n.6. The SOC set forth by
Coleman et al., see supra note 13, are a revision of the SOC used by the Kosilek
courts. See Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 739 n.6.
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Subsequently,1 6 MDOC retained another consultant, Dr.
Richard Dickey, who did not adhere to the SOC and who imposed
stricter requirements before he would prescribe hormones or
recommend SRS. 1"'
Dr. Dickey did not consider Kosilek a
candidate for SRS because she was incarcerated, and he
recommended that Kosilek not receive hormone therapy unless
she became depressed and unable to function.
Based on a
number of considerations, including Dr. Dickey's work, MDOC
Commissioner Michael Maloney adopted a "freeze-frame" policy for
inmates with GID. 10 9
In 2002, ten years after Kosilek initially filed her complaint,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that
she had failed to meet the subjective prong of the deliberate
indifference test and thus did not establish an Eighth Amendment

106. Kosilek , 221 F. Supp. 2d at 173. MDOC asked Dr. Forstein whether
Kosilek's status as an inmate and not as a member of the general population
altered his recommendations. Id. When he replied in the negative, he was
terminated. Id.
107. Id. Dr. Dickey required the individual to have one year or more of real life
experience living in the community, which is impossible for inmates. Id. Such a
requirement is expressly rejected by the SOC: 'The SOC in their entirety apply to
all transsexual, transgender, and gender-nonconforming people, irrespective of their
housing situation. People should not be discriminated against in their access to
appropriate health care based on where they live, including institutional
environments such as prisons or long-/intermediate-term facilities." Coleman et al.,
supra note 13, at 206 (emphases added) (citation omitted).
108. Kosilek 1, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 174. Even then, Dr. Dickey prescribed MDOCprovided hormones on a trial basis in order to determine whether the therapy
would improve Kosilek's condition. Id. After the adoption of the freeze-frame
policy, see infra note 109, MDOC implemented the Revised Treatment Plan for
Kosilek which stated that (1) a licensed mental health professional would provide
treatment and consult with Dr. Dickey if necessary, and (2) psychopharmacological
drugs would be prescribed to treat Kosilek's depression. Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d
at 174.
109. Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 170-71. The freeze-frame policy stated that an
inmate with GD would be managed according to how he or she entered the
correctional system and did not permit deviations for individualized care. Id. at
169, 171. Maloney made the decision based on several factors: (1) a memorandum
that summarized Dr. Dickey's research, which surveyed sixty-four correctional
programs worldwide and found that the majority would not consider SRS for an
inmate, id. at 169-70; (2) the fact that Maloney was told that Dr. Dickey advocated
the freeze-frame policy, id. at 169; (3) the fact that Maloney did not know about the
SOC; (4) the fact that MDOC's attorneys found no cases holding that the
Constitution required the provision of hormones if the inmate was not taking
hormones before incarceration, id. at 170; and (5) the fact that the freeze-frame
policy is employed by other prison facilities. See, e.g., Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163
F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Maloney's decision was in part based on his
misunderstanding of the U.S. Bureau of Prison's policy, which was a freeze-frame
policy that permitted treatment alterations if the inmate's medical needs changed.
Kosilek , 221 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87.
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violation.110 However, the court found that Kosilek suffered from a
serious medical need and that she had been denied adequate
11 2
It also concluded that the freeze-frame policy
medical care.1
prohibited medical professionals from adequately treating Kosilek
and other transgender inmates because it did not permit
deviations for individualized care. 1 3 But, according to the court,
Kosilek failed to show (1) that Maloney was deliberately
indifferent to Kosilek's serious medical need, and (2) that Maloney
would be deliberately indifferent to her serious medical need in the
future.11 4 Furthermore, the court concluded that while Maloney's
recommendations were motivated by the public's criticism of
providing these treatments using public funds, he was also
motivated by sincere security concerns.1
B. Kosilek 11: The Fight Continues
In 2000, while awaiting the court's judgment in Kosilek I,
Kosilek sued MDOC and a number of its medical professionals on
the grounds that the denial of SRS violated the Eighth
Amendment. 6 After the court issued its decision in Kosilek I in
2002, Maloney made a number of changes to MDOC policy
regarding inmates with GD. 11 7 First, the freeze-frame policy was

110. Kosilek , 221 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
111. Id. at 189.
112. At least one other court has held that, while the policy is permissible,
decisions regarding an inmate's treatment must be made on an individual basis.
Allard v. Gomez, 9 F. App'x 793, 795 (9th Cir. 2001). Dr. Dickey testified at trial,
but the court found him unpersuasive because he did not subscribe to the SOC,
which prudent medical professionals followed.
Kosilek II District Court, 889 F.
Supp. 2d 190, 216 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd, 740 F.3d 733, 738 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en
banc, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
113. Kosilek 1, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
114. Id. at 195. The court stated: "This court's decision puts Maloney on notice
that Kosilek has a serious medical need which is not being properly treated.
Therefore, he has a duty to respond reasonably to it. This court expects that he
will." Id. at 162.
115. Id. at 191. Regarding security concerns, Maloney estimated that 2 5% of the
inmates under MDOC custody were sex offenders. Id. at 194. As a result, he was
concerned that permitting an inmate with breasts to live as a woman in a men's
facility would lead to violence and injuries to both correctional personnel and
inmates. Id. at 170. Maloney also believed that permitting Kosilek to have
makeup would lead to its use by Kosilek or other inmates to escape custody. Id.
116. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d 733, 738 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en bane, 774
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
117. Id. at 740. The district court opined that "[i]f Maloney had remained the
Commissioner of the [M]DOC, he might have heeded the court's warning that an
injunction would issue if he denied Kosilek adequate medical care because of a fear
of controversy or criticism." Kosilek II District Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
However, Deputy Commissioner Kathleen Dennehy became the Commissioner in
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replaced with a presumptive policy: Inmates received hormone
therapy if they were prescribed the treatment at the time of
incarceration, and treatment plans could be altered as deemed
necessary by medical professionals.118 Dr. David Seil, a genderidentity-disorder specialist retained by MDOC, evaluated Kosilek
and recommended a course of treatment including estrogen
therapy, electrolysis hair removal, and access to female personal
items. 1 9 Dr. Seil also noted that SRS might be a final step in
treating Kosilek.1 2' Kosilek followed Dr. Seil's plan from 2003 to
2006, and the prison reported no resultant security issues.12' By
September 2004, Kosilek had been receiving hormone treatments
and living as a woman for more than one year; therefore, under
the SOC and Dr. Seil's
recommendations, she was eligible to be
12 2
evaluated for SRS.
The consultants MDOC hired to evaluate Kosilek disagreed
over the best course of treatment.1 2 3
One organization
recommended SRS,1 24 but another consultant disagreed.12 5 Dr.
December 2003 and immediately stated that "she wanted to 'regroup on this GID
stuff."' Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.2d at 741. Dennehy testified at trial that she
would rather retire than obey an order from the U.S. Supreme Court to authorize
SRS for an inmate. Id. at 750. Three more Commissioners would join the fray
before the First Circuit issued its first opinion in January 2014: James Bender in
May 2007; Bender's successor, Harold Clarke, in November 2007, Kosilek II First
Circuit, 740 F.3d at 755; and Luis Spencer, who was appointed in May 2011,
Kosilek IIDistrict Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
118. Kosilek I[District Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
119. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 740-41.
120. Id. at 741.
121. Kosilek IlDistrict Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
122. Kosilek II First Circuit, 740 F.3d at 741. MDOC contracted the University
of Massachusetts Correctional Health Program ("UMass") to provide medical and
mental health services for all inmates. Id. at 740.
123. Kosilek II First Circuit, 740 F.3d at 742-44. Dr. Kenneth Appelbaum,
UMass's Mental Health Program Director, recommended retaining the Fenway
Community Health Center ("Fenway Center"), a facility focused on serving the
LGBT community. Id. at 742. Gregory Hughes, MDOC Director of Mental Health
and Substance Abuse Services, expressed concerns that the Fenway Center might
be too sympathetic to Kosilek and too readily recommend SRS. Id. at 742. Hughes
recommended Cynthia Osborne, a gender-identity specialist with experience
working with correctional facilities. Id. Hughes believed that Osborne would be
more objective and sympathetic to MDOC. Id. However, MDOC retained the
Fenway Center first, and Dr. Kevin Kapila and Dr. Randi Kaufman evaluated
Kosilek. Id.
124. Id. The Fenway Center reported that Kosilek had surpassed the requisite
one-year period of hormone treatment necessary to receive SRS, and that she
adapted well to the treatments provided, but that she still suffered from
substantial distress. Id.
125. Id. at 743. MDOC, dissatisfied with the Fenway Center report, hired
Osborne to conduct a peer review of the report. Id. Osborne criticized the Fenway
Center for failing to consider whether Kosilek suffered from any personality
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Kenneth Appelbaum recommended SRS based on a report drafted
by the doctors at the Fenway Community Health Center
of
126
Massachusetts evaluating Kosilek ("Fenway Center Report").
127
The case attracted significant public and media attention.
At the trial, which began in 2006, medical professionals for both
Kosilek and MDOC testified that Kosilek had GID. 128 Several of
the medical professionals testified that the SOC were generally
accepted and widely used in treating GD, 12 9 and some stated that
13
SRS was medically necessary to adequately treat Kosilek's GD. 1
Commissioners
Kathleen
Dennehy
and
Harold
Clarke
continuously claimed that the security concerns posed by SRS
were insurmountable. '' 131
disorders and opined that the SOC were not suitable in a prison environment. Id.
at 743-44. As the district court notes, Osborne was a faculty member of Johns
Hopkins University School of Medicine, whose head of psychiatry was known for
his belief that SRS is "religiously abhorrent." Kosilek II District Court, 889 F.
Supp. 2d at 221. Furthermore, Osborne was involved in De'Lonta V.Angelone. 330
F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). In De'Lonta, Osborne recommended the termination
of an inmate's hormone therapy, and the inmate then mutilated her genitals. Id. at
635. Osborne was also one of several medical professionals retained by the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections to assess an inmate with GD. Konitzer v.
Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 883, 887 (E.D. Wis. 2010). Osborne concluded that
"focusing on Konitzer's treatment on adjustment rather than cross gender
transition [was] a clinically sound and ethically wise stance." Id. at 889. Notably,
that inmate attempted to castrate herself several times (and was ultimately
successful) and attempted suicide at least twice. Id. at 905.
126. Kosilek IlDistrict Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 221-22.
127. Id. at 225. Kosilek's suits were widely covered by the local media and
garnered significant opposition from both the general public and politicians. E.g.,
Brian McGrory, A Test Case for a Change, BOS. GLOBE (June 13, 2000),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2000/06/13/test-case-for-change/s9jYsy33HXfJ3a
jRNZYpMO/story.html; Eileen McNamara, When Gender Isn't Relevant, BOS.
GLOBE (June 11, 2006), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/06/11/when
gender isnt relevant/. Clarke received one letter signed by seventeen state
senators and another signed by twenty-five state representatives opposing the use
of public funds for SRS for an inmate. Kosilek II District Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at
246. As the court noted, Dennehy participated in a local news broadcast in which
she noted that she was opposed to providing Kosilek with surgery. Id. at 223. The
same news segment interviewed a state senator, who stated that he was sponsoring
a bill that would prohibit the use of tax revenues to provide SRS to inmates. Id. at
215.
128. Kosilek IlDistrict Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 225-27.
129. Id. at 226.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 228. Dennehy claimed that the SRS would have to be performed out
of state due to a lack of qualified physicians in Massachusetts and that this would
provide Kosilek with an opportunity to escape custody. Kosilek II First Circuit, 740
F.3d at 745. The question of where to house Kosilek after SRS also posed concerns.
MDOC was unable to create a special ward for prisoners with GD. Kosilek II En
Banc, 774 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015)
(mem.). According to MDOC, transferring Kosilek to an out-of-state facility would
be difficult because it was unlikely that any state would be willing to take her. Id.
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In 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts decided Kosilek II, holding that MDOC needed to
provide Kosilek with SRS "as promptly as possible."' 13 2 The district
court made five findings. First, Kosilek successfully established
that she suffered from severe gender identity disorder, which
would result in serious harm if not properly treated.133 Second, as
seen from testimony of various medical professionals, SRS was the
only adequate method to treat Kosilek's GID; therefore, Kosilek
134
satisfied the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test.
Third, Kosilek also satisfied the subjective prong of the deliberate
indifference test because officials at the University of
Massachusetts Correctional Health Program and Dennehy all
knew that Kosilek's severe GID, if left untreated by the
recommended means, posed a serious risk of harm.1 35 Fourth,
MDOC did not assert its security concerns in good faith; instead,
the court concluded that MDOC's primary objective was to avoid

at 80. And, if Kosilek remained in the men's facility, she would be at risk for
physical and sexual assault. Id. at 79. Spencer, then-superintendent of MCINorfolk, stated that the only alternative would be to place Kosilek in the highsecurity Special Management Unit, where Kosilek would be confined to her cell for
twenty-three hours a day. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 749.
Similarly, Dennehy and others argued that transferring Kosilek to a women's
facility was problematic.
Id. at 745.
According to Lynne Bissonnette,
superintendent of MCI-Framingham, where Kosilek would likely be housed, the
majority of female inmates at the facility were victims of domestic abuse or sexual
assault. Id. at 751. Bissonnette was concerned that Kosilek, who had strangled
her wife, might become a predator or the victim of violence. Id. Bissonnette
further noted that, unlike male inmates, female inmates requiring mental health
services beyond those provided by prison staff were not sent to a secured facility,
but to a public state hospital. Id. This, combined with MCI-Framingham's weak
security perimeter, presented the risk that Kosilek would try to escape custody. Id.
For a thorough discussion of MDOC's testimony regarding safety concerns, see
Kosilek liEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 79-82.
While the post-operative incarceration of an inmate is a significant issue, it is
beyond the scope of this Comment. However, it is interesting to note that Clarke's
former employer, the Washington Department of Corrections, housed a postoperative MTF inmate in a female facility without any issues, despite the fact that
she was incarcerated for murdering a female family member. Kosilek II District
Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
132. Kosilek IlDistrict Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
133. Id. at 230.
134. Id. at 236. The court concluded that MDOC's expert, Dr. Chester Schmidt,
was not a prudent professional based on his rejection of the SOC and the testimony
of the other medical professionals. Id. at 235-36. His proposed treatment of
continuing hormones and providing psychotherapy and medication to manage
Kosilek's GD and depression would only treat the symptoms of Kosilek's GD. Id. at
236. However, treatment of the underlying cause required SRS. Id. Dr. Schmidt's
treatment plan would not reduce Kosilek's suffering to the point where it no longer
constituted a serious medical need. Id.
135. Id. at 238.
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criticism and controversy. 136
Lastly, MDOC's deliberate
indifference would continue without judicial intervention.137 With
the words "[d]efendant shall take forthwith all of the actions
reasonably necessary to provide Kosilek sex reassignment surgery
as promptly as possible, 138 the court ordered the first state-funded
sex reassignment surgery for a transgender inmate in the
country's history. 139
III. The First Circuit Weighs in
A.

Round One: DirectAppeal

MDOC appealed on two grounds, 140 alleging that the district
court erred in finding that (1) MDOC violated the Eighth
Amendment right to adequate medical treatment by denying
Kosilek's SRS treatment, 14 and (2) MDOC
was deliberately
142
indifferent to Kosilek's serious medical needs.
In January 2014, a three-judge panel for the First Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. 143 It found
that MDOC had no legitimate penological reasons for denying
144
Kosilek SRS, and thus violated her Eighth Amendment rights.
According to the panel, there was sufficient evidence to support
the district court's conclusion that SRS would be the only
medically adequate treatment for Kosilek's GD. 141 MDOC alleged
that the district court's holding effectively required a medical
treatment to be curative to comport with the Eighth
Amendment. 146 The First-Circuit panel disagreed and found that
the district court's conclusion was limited to the facts of Kosilek's
136. Id. at 247.
137. Id. at 250-51.
138. Id. at 251.
139. See id. The court declined to decide who should perform the surgery, where
it should be performed, and where Kosilek should be incarcerated afterwards. Id.
140. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d 733, 759 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en bane, 774
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
141. 1d.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 772-73.
145. Id. at 766. While MDOC provided numerous forms of treatment for
Kosilek, including hormone therapy, psychotherapy, and feminine items, SRS was
medically required and in-line with the SOC. See supra notes 65, 66. Several
physicians testified that Kosilek had been on hormones for a significant amount of
time and met the minimum real-life-experience living requirement necessitated by
the SOC. Kosilek II First Circuit, 740 F.3d at 765-66. Thus, the next logical
treatment was SRS. Id. at 766.
146. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 765.

2016]

Transcending the Corporeal Prison

case-it did not require curative treatment in order to be
constitutionally adequate.147 Drawing on the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in De'Lonta v. Johnson, the panel reiterated that a
violation of the Eighth Amendment did not require a total denial
of treatment and that "some" treatment was not the same as
"adequate" treatment.148 Thus, the district court did not err when
it concluded, based on credible physician testimony, that Kosilek
suffered from a life-threatening disorder for which surgery was the
only adequate treatment.1 49 Thus, the objective prong of the
deliberate indifference test was satisfied. 150
Second, the three-judge panel concluded that the district
court did not err in finding that MDOC falsified and embellished
its security risk rationales for denying Kosilek SRS.15 1 While
MDOC's decisions regarding medical care for inmates are entitled
to substantial deference, that deference is not limitless. 51 2 The
district court had found evidence of unnecessary delay tactics 3 in
MDOC's inadequate security reviews,1 5 4 exaggerated security
concerns, 15 and overt deference to public criticism.1 56 Additionally,
MDOC's concerns about capitulating to inmate threats of suicide
did not convince the First Circuit panel that deference was
appropriate. 15 7 Therefore, the subjective prong of the deliberate
indifference test was also satisfied. 158

147. Id.
148. Id. (citing De'Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 520-26 (4th Cir. 2013)).
149. Id. at 765-66.
150. Id. at 766.
151. Id. at 769-71.
152. Id. at 767-68. The court cites Battista u. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir.
2011), which affirmed the district court's order to MDOC to provide hormone
therapy for an inmate with GD.
153. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 768.
154. Id. at 769.
155. Id. at 769-71. The First Circuit reviewed the district court's findings
regarding security, namely: (1) MDOC's experience in transporting prisoners
ensures that it is "near certain" (in the words of Clarke) that Kosilek would be
securely transported to and from surgery; and (2) there was evidence of feasible
housing options for Kosilek post-SRS both at MCI-Norfolk and MCI-Framingham.
Id. at 769.
156. Id. at 771.
While there was not overwhelming evidence that public
criticism played a strong role in MDOC's decision, the court deferred to the
judgment of the district court regarding questions of credibility. Id.
157. Id. at 772. While the court agreed that MDOC should not yield to inmate
threats of self-harm, it concluded that self-harm for inmates with GD was not
uncommon, MDOC was well-equipped to assess whether threats were legitimate or
manufactured, and the penological objective was not sufficient to deny medical
treatment deemed necessary by medical professionals. Id.
158. Id.
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Judge Torruella dissented on the grounds that the majority's
decision extended beyond the limits of established Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. 51 9 According to Judge Torruella, the
district court's division of the issues into five distinct topics
wrongly precluded the court from considering the areas where the
objective and subjective prongs of the test overlap.160
Judge
Torruella argued that the denial of SRS, while "uncompassionate"
or "unpopular," was not "imprudent," especially in light Kosilek's
incarceration and status as an inmate.161 As to the "serious risk" of
Kosilek experiencing emotional distress, Judge Torruella noted
that "if an alternative short of surgery is still sufficient to address,
with minimal adequacy, Kosilek's medical need, no constitutional
claim can arise. 162 MDOC had taken steps to treat Kosilek's GD,
and Kosilek had admitted that the care was tailored to-and
adequately treated-her severe emotional distress. 163 The dissent
found that MDOC articulated genuine security concerns. 164 The
district court's finding that MDOC was influenced by public
criticism was insufficient because the evidence showed only that
public opposition existed-not that public criticism was what
motivated MDOC. 165 Therefore, the dissent would have held that
Kosilek's Eighth Amendment claim failed because the MDOC's

159. Id. at 773 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 777.
161. Id. at 777-80. Judge Torruella also took issue with the district court's
recasting of the testimony of its own independent expert witness, Dr. Stephen
Levine. Id. at 778-79. Dr. Levine stated that MDOC's expert witness, Dr.
Schmidt, and the treatment plan he advocated complied with prudent professional
standards. Id. at 779. The district court, however, dismissed this finding and
required Dr. Levine to presume that Kosilek met all the SOC requirements and
faced no other obstacles to surgery. Id. at 778. The dissent found no evidence that
Dr. Levine believed Dr. Schmidt's treatment proposal was unreasonable. Id. at
780.
162. Id. at 780.
163. Id. at 781.
164. Id. at 781. The dissent cites Farmer u.Brennan, where the Supreme Court
held that the prison officials' decision to permit the inmate to remain in the general
male population, despite her pre-operation feminine form, could amount to
subjective indifference. Id. at 782 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994)). The dissent disagreed with the district court's conclusions about security
in two ways: (1) the rapid speed with which MDOC performed a security review
did not mean that the review was inadequate, and (2) MDOC's unfamiliarity with
Kosilek's personal characteristics, and with her record of good behavior, did not
preclude them from testifying to general security concerns created by housing a
post-operation Kosilek in the general male population. Id. The dissent also argued
that a lack of security incidents at the prison did not "render inappropriate or
unreasonable [M]DOC's concerns that issues might present themselves in Kosilek's
post-operative future." Id. at 782-83.
165. Id. at 783.
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denial of SRS was not medically imprudent: It had provided
Kosilek with treatment that decreased her 166
mental anguish, and it
was prepared to offer additional treatment.
B.

Round Two: RehearingEn Banc

On February 12, 2014, the First Circuit reheard the case en
banc. 161 On December 16, 2014, it reversed the January 2014
168
opinion and remanded the case to the trial court for dismissal.
Unlike the January 2014 decision that had concluded that the
correct standard of review was "clear error ,,19 the First Circuit on
rehearing stated that "[t]he ultimate legal conclusion of whether
prison administrators have violated the Eighth Amendment is
reviewed de novo. '7 9
This time, the First Circuit held that Kosilek failed to satisfy
both prongs of the test.1 71 Regarding the objective prong, the court
of appeals disagreed with the district court's finding that Dr.
Schmidt's views were medically imprudent.1 7 2 Based on the record,
the en banc First Circuit concluded that the SOC are flexible.173 As
part of its imprudence finding, the district court had emphasized
the fact that Dr. Schmidt did not write letters of recommendation,
but this court found that Dr. Schmidt's letters confirming Kosilek's
readiness for SRS were equivalent to letters of recommendation. 174
The majority opinion also stated that the district court had
misinterpreted Dr. Schmidt's testimony to mean that he believed

166. Id. at 784.
167. Kosilek II En Banc, 774 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
168. Id. at 96.
169. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 763.
170. Kosilek II En Banc, 774 F.3d at 84. Both Judges Kayatta and Thompson,
who were members of the original panel, disagreed with the standard of review. Id.
at 97-102 (Thompson, J., dissenting); id. at 115 (Kayatta, J., dissenting). Judge
Kayatta argued in his dissent: "Until today, there was absolutely no precedent
(and the majority cites none) for reviewing such quintessentially factual findings
under anything other than the clear error test." Id. at 115 (Kayatta, J., dissenting).
While Judge Kayatta did not agree with the district court's findings, he reminded
the majority: "I am not the trial judge in this case. Nor are my colleagues. And
that is the rub." Id. at 114. Judge Thompson was less forgiving in her dissent,
providing a detailed analysis of the appropriate standard of review and asserting
that the majority "maneuver[ed] the standard of review into its most favorable
form." Id. at 98 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Judge Torruella, author of the
majority opinion, had argued for de novo review in his dissent on the three-judge
panel. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 763 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
171. Kosilek liEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 96.
172. Id. at 87.
173. Id. at 87.
174. Id. at 88.
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antidepressants and psychotherapy alone were sufficient to treat
GD.1 7 ' To the contrary, the court found that MDOC's expert
testified that he believed the MDOC treatment plan continued
Kosilek's ameliorative GD treatments (hormone therapy and
electrolysis) and provided antidepressants and psychotherapy if
she developed suicidal ideation. 176 Lastly, although the trial court
found Dr. Schmidt imprudent because he believed that real-life
experience was impossible in prison,1 77 the First Circuit found that
prudent medical professionals disagreed over what constitutes
real-life experience.17' For example, Dr. Levine expressed doubts
that an inmate could be exposed to the types of societal, familial,
179
and vocational pressures that make up real-life experience.
Therefore, since Dr. Schmidt was not an imprudent professional,
the Fenway Center's recommendations were not the only
medically prudent plan. 10
The en banc court of appeals believed that the district court
had mischaracterized MDOC's treatment plan, which was to
continue Kosilek's existing GD treatments."1 The question before
the court, therefore, was not whether antidepressants and
psychotherapy adequately treated Kosilek's GD, but whether the
denial of SRS was sufficiently harmful to violate the Eighth
1 2
Amendment in light of the treatment MDOC did provide.
MDOC had a plan to treat Kosilek if she developed depression or
suicidal ideation.1 8 3 Therefore, in the eyes of the en banc First
Circuit, MDOC could choose one of two treatment plans
recommended by prudent medical professionals-one that involved
SRS and one that did not-and MDOC's choice
of one over the
18 4
other did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
As for the subjective prong, the court held that Kosilek failed
to show that MDOC was deliberately indifferent to her serious risk
of harm.18 Judge Torruella reiterated his earlier dissent: "The
choice of a medical option that, although disfavored by some in the

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. Again, the SOC arguably contradict the type of argument made by Dr.
Schmidt. See supra note 107.
180. Kosilek lIEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 89.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 90.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 91.
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field, is presented by competent professionals does not exhibit a
level of inattention or callousness to a prisoner's needs rising to a
constitutional violation."1" Even if the district court determined
that the prison officials erred in evaluating the treatment's
reasonableness, it did not mean that MDOC was deliberately
indifferent.187 In addition, the court concluded that MDOC's safety
concerns were reasonable.8 The district court had focused on the
fact that there had been no security issues for Kosilek, but that
fact did not negate MDOC's concerns for future safety issues that
might arise if Kosilek received SRS." 9 The court found that the
district court disregarded MDOC's decades of experience operating
correctional facilities, and that the post-operative housing
concerns were "within the realm of reason." 90
Further, according to the en banc court, the trial judge's
findings-that MDOC security concerns were pretextual and that
the officials' decisions were motivated by public criticism-were
erroneous for two reasons.1 First, even if MDOC were motivated
by public and political criticism, that fact did not negate the
relevance of the reasonable safety concerns articulated by MDOC
officials.1 2 MDOC was consistent in its expressed concerns, and
Kosilek did not produce evidence that the concerns lacked merit. 3
Second, a court must examine the current attitudes and conduct of
the prison officials to determine injunctive relief.19 The district
court based its pretext conclusion on the actions of Commissioner
Dennehy, whose attitude did not necessarily reflect those of her
successors.
There was no evidence that public criticism
influenced Commissioner Clarke-who actually made the decision
to deny Kosilek SRS-or Commissioner Spencer. 196
The dissent penned by Judge Thompson first criticized the
grant of the rehearing en banc.19 ' She argued: "This case does not
satisfy the well-settled requirements for a grant of en banc."198
186. Id. at 91-92.
187. Id. at 92.
188. Id. at 94.
189. Id. at 93.
190. Id. at 94 (quoting Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 454 (1st Cir. 2011)).
191. Id. at 94-95.
192. Id. at 94.
193. Id. at 95.
194. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 96.
197. Id. at 97 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
198. Id. En bane relief is typically granted if "en bane consideration is necessary
to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions ... or [if] the proceeding
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More importantly, Judge Thompson disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the appropriate standard of review is de novo.199
Judge Thompson argued that, if the majority had reviewed the
district court's decision under the appropriate standard-clear
error review-the trial court's conclusion that Kosilek satisfied
both prongs was well supported for several reasons. 20 First, the
district court's finding that Dr. Schmidt was not a prudent medical
professional was not clearly erroneous in light of Dr. Schmidt's
fundamental disagreement with the widely accepted SOC 21 and
his rejection of the belief that real-life experience is possible in
prison.02 Additionally, while Dr. Schmidt testified that Kosilek
progressed well on her treatment, the majority of other testifying
medical professionals believed the suggested treatment plan was
unreasonable.2 3
Finally, both the testimony and evidence
presented to the district court show that only SRS was adequate to
treat Kosilek's GID.20 4 The evidence supported the lower court's
conclusion that Kosilek was still in danger of life-threatening risk
of harm, and that she continued to suffer substantial mental
anguish .20
The district court did not disregard the rest of
Kosilek's treatment plan, as the majority asserted, but simply
concluded as the fact finder that "treating the underlying disorder
and its symptoms are two very different things.20 6
Judge Thompson also argued that the evidence supported the
district court's finding as to the subjective prong.0

7

First, the

majority's argument that prison officials are insulated from Eighth
Amendment claims when they choose between contradictory
medical opinions is highly problematic208 because, under that logic,
prison officials could ignore the recommendations of medical
professionals by simply finding a physician with a different

involves a question of exceptional importance." Id. Judge Thompson argued that
this case matched neither criteria. Id.
199. Id. at 97-98. See supra note 170.
200. Kosilek liEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 102, 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 102.
202. Id. at 103. The majority claimed that the district court reached this
conclusion on its own. Id. at 88 (majority opinion). However, Judge Thompson
pointed to the district court's findings in Kosilek , which were based on testimony
from medical professionals, and its incorporation of the conclusion into Kosilek II
District Court. Id. at 103 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 104.
204. Id. at 105-06.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 106.
207. Id. at 107.
208. Id.
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opinion. °9 In addition, the district court's conclusion that MDOC
was deliberately indifferent was supported by a finding of "denial,
delay, or interference with prescribed health care. 21 9 Third,
evidence supported the finding that the security concerns cited by
MDOC were pretextual: The district court noted that MDOC's
security reports were rushed and results-driven. 11 The district
court also believed that the security concerns were greatly
exaggerated because of the "throw -it-up-and-see-what-sticks
approach" taken by MDOC.2 12 Many of the concerns cited by
MDOC-such as transportation and housing-were either
embellished or within MDOC's power to adequately resolve. 3
Lastly, Judge Thompson argued that the district court had
sufficient basis to find that Commissioner Dennehy's successors
were not credible. 24 Because the evidence supported the district
court's finding of deliberate indifference, the district court did not
clearly err.21 The majority's decision, Judge Thompson believed,
"pave[d] the way for unprincipled grants of en banc relief,
decimate[d] the deference paid to a trial judge following a bench
trial, aggrieve[d] an already marginalized community, and
enable [d] correctional systems to further postpone their
adjustment to the crumbling gender binary. 1' 6
IV. Kosilek II and Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
A.

The Eighth Amendment and Medical Treatment

The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted. 2 1' 7 At the heart of the amendment is the
fear of "the imposition of torture
and other cruel
punishments... by
judges
acting
beyond
their
lawful

209. Id. at 108.
210. Id. at 109 (quoting Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011)).
211. Id. at 110.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 110-11.
214. Id. at 112-13. The district court found that several of Clarke's claims were
not credible and criticized his hasty security review (suggesting improper
motivation), the fact that he did not consult Spencer (then-superintendent of MCINorfolk), and his lack of familiarity with the trial record before denying the surgery
once he took office. Id.
215. Id. at 113.
216. Id.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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authority. '218 In adopting the Eighth Amendment, the drafters of
the Constitution "were primarily concerned, however, with
proscribing 'tortures' and other 'barbarous' methods of
punishment., 219 Early in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the
courts utilized the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment to assess whether specific methods of execution were
sufficiently cruel to amount to a constitutional violation.2
Notably, the Supreme Court declined to restrict the definition of
"barbarous" and "torture" to the eighteenth-century understanding
of the terms.221 Recognizing that for "a principle to be vital, [it]
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
222
it birth," the Court has applied the Eighth Amendment flexibly.
Expanding further on the adaptability of the Eighth Amendment,
the Court has acknowledged that the judgment of what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment cannot be "fastened to the obsolete,
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice.22 3
In short, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the22 4Eighth Amendment is not static or fixed to a
single point in time.
Importantly, the Supreme Court noted:
The Amendment embodies "broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency...
against which we must evaluate penal measures. Thus, we
have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments
which are incompatible with "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," or
which "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain. ,,225
An assessment of the allegedly unconstitutional treatment
requires an assessment of contemporary views regarding the
punishment. 26 In the past two decades, the Supreme Court has

218. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 (1977) (citing Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 371-73 (1910)).
219. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976) (citing Anthony F. Granucci,
"Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L.
REV. 839, 842 (1969)).
220. Id. at 170.
221. Id. at 171.
222. Id. (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 373).
223. Id. (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 378).
224. Id. at 172-73.
225. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (citations omitted).
226. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
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held that executions of the intellectually disabled 227 and offenders
under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime's commission 22"
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Furthermore, the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment has not been limited to physical punishments.2 2 9 The
Eighth Amendment thus establishes the right of inmates to
humane treatment.2 3 The Supreme Court has held that the denial
of medical treatment for inmates by prison officials may rise to the
level of a constitutional violation.231 In the landmark case of
Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court articulated the obligation of
prison officials to provide adequate medical services as follows:
An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical
needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be
met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce
physical "torture or a lingering death," the evils of most
immediate concern to the drafters of the Amendment. In less
serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and
suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological
purpose.
The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is

inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as
manifested in modern legislation codifying the common law
view that "it is but just that the public be required to care for
the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his
liberty, care for himself."
We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain," proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment."

The idea that convicted criminals are guaranteed adequate
medical care by the Constitution, but average citizens living
productively in the community are not granted such a right, is
bizarre.
This may be why courts have defined adequate medical

227. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
228. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005); see Jordon Calvert Greenlee,
Victims of Youth: Equitable Sentencing Reform for Juvenile Offenders in the Wake
of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, 33 LAW & INEQ. 263 (2015); Lindsey E.
Krause, One Size Does Not Fit All: The Need for a Complete Abolition of Mandatory
Minimum Sentences for Juveniles in Response to Roper, Graham, and Miller, 33
LAW & INEQ. 481 (2015).
229. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
230. Kosilek L, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002).
231. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
232. Id. at 103-05 (citations omitted).
233. Kosilek H1 District Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 198 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd,
740 F.3d 733, 763 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.). Some might argue that if Kosilek is
provided SRS, other transgender individuals who cannot afford SRS may commit
minor crimes to become eligible for the procedure while incarcerated. However,
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care as the minimum required treatment for the inmate's
condition.234 But, as the Supreme Court has held, incarcerated
individuals are unique because they cannot procure medical
services for themselves and must rely on prison officials to supply
them with the basic necessities of life, such as medical
treatment. 3 Although some view inmates like Kosilek as "hated
criminal[s], deserving of punishment ,,236 the district court in
Kosilek I counseled:

Kosilek is a special case precisely because of her crime. Because of the heinousness
of her crime, Kosilek is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole.
Kosilek , 221 F. Supp. 2d at 158. Kosilek will never have a chance to live in the
community and receive SRS unless it is provided by MDOC. Real-life experience
for Kosilek is different from real-life experience for other transgender individuals
because prison is Kosilek's permanent environment. Therefore, real-life experience
for Kosile necessarily means living as a woman within the confines of a prison. As
several medical professionals testified, and the district court found, SRS is
"medically necessary" to treat Kosilek's GD and alleviate her substantial mental
distress. Kosilek II District Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 226. To eliminate the
problem of individuals committing minor crimes to access SRS while incarcerated,
MDOC could institute a policy that SRS would only be available to inmates serving
life sentences and for whom SRS is medically necessary.
234. Kosilek II First Circuit, 740 F.3d 733, 774 (1st Cir. 2014) (Torruella, J.,
dissenting), rev'd en banc, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059
(2015) (mem.). The dissent stated:
[T]his worthy pledge of protection is made practicable through the creation
of a floor below which the standard of care must not fall. Prison officials
commit no violation so long as the medical care is minimally
adequate .... [[T]his obligation is met in full measure by the provision
of... services at a level reasonably commensurate with modern medical
science and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional standards."
This limit on the scope of the Eighth Amendment's protection is clear:
care need not be ideal, so long as it is both diligent and within the bounds
of prudence. Neither do all instances of inadequate care constitute
constitutional violations.
Id. at 774-75 (citations omitted); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 ("[A] prisoner
must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend
,evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment."); Maggert v.
Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that a prisoner is only entitled to
minimum medical care); Jackson v. Faire, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
Constitution does require that prisoners be provided with a certain minimum level
of medical treatment.").
235. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. In Brown u.Plata,the Supreme Court declared:
To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their
own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food, clothing, and
necessary medical care. A prison's failure to provide sustenance for
inmates "may actually produce 'physical torture or a lingering death."'
Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not
provided adequate medical care.
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (citations omitted).
236. Rachel Rezabek, (D)evolving Standards of Decency: The Unworkability of
Current Eighth Amendment Jurisprudenceas Illustrated by Kosilek v. Spencer, 87
S. CAL. L. REV. 389, 418 (2014).
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The Constitution does not protect this right [to medical
treatment] because we are a nation that coddles criminals.
Rather, we recognize and respect this right because we are,
fundamentally, a decent people, and decent people do not
allow other human
beings in 237
their custody to suffer needlessly
....
from serious illness or injury.
The evolution and expansion of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence does not arise from a misguided attempt by the
Court to "coddle criminals." Criminals-especially murderers like
Kosilek-are unpopular candidates for compassionate, humane
treatment because, arguably, they denied their victims any
semblance of compassion. However, at the heart of the Eighth
Amendment is "the concept of human dignity, 238 which prohibits
not only the deprivation of basic necessities for survival, but
guarantees an inmate a life without "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain. , 231 Under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate's
lack of compassion for his or her victim does not and cannot justify
the government's lack of compassion for the inmate. After2 40all, "an
eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind.
B. Adequate Treatment for Gender Dysphoria
An inmate diagnosed with gender dysphoria is no different
from an inmate with a broken leg, schizophrenia, kidney failure, or
any other medical condition. As the Seventh Circuit stated:
"Surely, had the Wisconsin legislature passed a law that DOC
inmates with cancer must be treated only with therapy and pain
killers, this court would have no trouble concluding that the law
was unconstitutional. 4 1 Many courts have recognized that GD
can be a severe medical condition 42 -one that is recognized by

237. Kosilek L, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002).
238. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1928.
239. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
240. GANDHI (Columbia Pictures 1982).
While this quote is frequently
attributed to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, there is no record of Gandhi ever
using the phrase. For a brief history of the saying, see Garson O'Toole, An Eye for
an Eye Will Make the Whole World Blind, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2010/12/27/eye-for-eye-blind
(last visited Oct. 18,

2015).
241. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2011).
242. Seven circuits have held that gender dysphoria is a serious medical
condition. See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 454-55 (1st Cir. 2011); Fields, 653
F.3d at 554; De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003); Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970
(10th Cir. 1995); Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991);
White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at
184.
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various medical associations.243
Just like any other medical
condition, there are generally recognized standards of care for GD,
and it is the duty of the prison officials to provide care that
comports with these standards. While prison officials are entitled
to deference regarding the safety and security of correctional
facilities and inmates, they do not have the specialized knowledge
necessary to diagnose and treat medical conditions.244 Just as
courts must defer to the judgment of prison officials, prison
officials must defer to the judgment of medical professionals. To
do otherwise permits prison officials to abdicate their duty to
provide adequate medical care for the inmates for whom they are
responsible.
The SOC for gender dysphoria includes hormone therapy,
electrolysis, and sex reassignment surgery. 45 Under the SOC, SRS
may be necessary for some individuals with severe GD. 246 Several
medical professionals deemed Kosilek as one such individual.2 47 It
is true that physicians do not always agree on the best course of
treatment for every patient. As evidenced by Kosilek, professional
opinions can-and often do-span the spectrum. But as Judge
Thompson warned in her dissent, allowing prison officials to deny
an inmate treatment because contrasting medical opinions exist is
a slippery slope. 24 Assessing the proper course of treatment for a
patient is a difficult task; every patient is unique, and
considerations include the patient's symptoms and responses to
different treatments, as well as the available treatment options.
Physicians assess the patient's medical needs and history to
design a treatment plan-rarely is there only one possible course
of action.
Given the complexity of designing treatment plans,
permitting prison officials to capitalize on disagreements between
medical professionals is both unfair and unreasonable.
The
Supreme Court has held that the humane treatment of inmates
and the provision of adequate medical care is required by the
Eighth Amendment.249
Guidelines such as the SOC and

243. See supra notes 45, 51.
244. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d 733, 767 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 774
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 63, 64.
247. See Kosilek II En Banc, 774 F.3d 63, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.); Kosilek IlDistrict Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at
226.
248. Kosilek liEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 107-08 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 229, 230, 231, 232.
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individualized plans that receive the support of multiple
physicians must be given significant weight in determining the
best treatment for an inmate's condition. Otherwise, the result is
a case like Kosilek II. There, both the SOC and the majority of
testifying medical professionals recommended SRS.
However,
when MDOC was displeased by the Fenway Center's SRS
recommendation, it merely hired another consultant.2 0 Osborne,
this new consultant, attacked the Fenway Report and concluded
that Kosilek was not eligible for SRS, much to MDOC's
advantage.21 The First Circuit's en banc opinion essentially
sanctioned MDOC's attempt to game the system and to provide
Kosilek with the treatment it wanted to be adequate, rather than
the treatment deemed adequate by a majority of the medical
professionals it consulted.
By insulating prison officials from a deliberate indifference
finding whenever there are contrasting medical opinions, the
First Circuit permits prison officials to overrule physicians. But
medical treatments have long-lasting and serious consequences for
patients. For example, Kosilek attempted self-castration and
suicide because of her gender dysphoria
Several physicians and
Kosilek testified that she would be likely to attempt suicide again
if she were denied SRS.25 4 In one of the cases discussed by the
majority, De'Lonta v.Johnson, the inmate mutilated her genitals
multiple times. 2 5 In that case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that,
even though the Virginia Department of Corrections provided the
petitioner with psychological care and hormone treatment in line
with the SOC, "it does not follow that they have necessarily
provided her with constitutionallyadequate treatment. 2 6 So, even
if MDOC's preferred plan effectively treats any suicidal ideation
that may arise, 7 allowing MDOC to treat the symptoms of
Kosilek's disorder-and not the cause of the symptoms-should

250. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d 733, 742 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 774
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.); see supra text
accompanying notes 123, 124, 125.
251. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 743.
252. Kosilek liEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 107 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
253. Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 738.
254. Kosilek liEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 75-76.
255. De'Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522 (4th Cir. 2013). The petitioner,
De'Lonta, is the same inmate in De'Lonta u.Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir.
2003). Id. at 522. Like Kosilek, De'Lonta's fight has spanned over a decade and
multiple court decisions. See id.; De'Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634.
256. De'Lonta, 708 F.3d at 526.
257. Kosilek liEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 86.
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not qualify as adequate treatment. 2 " Kosilek testified about the
mental anguish and continued distress caused by her male
genitalia; 29 combined with doctors' testimony regarding Kosilek's
likely future suicidal ideation, MDOC's and the First Circuit's
denial of SRS amounts to the type "unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain '260 that the Eighth Amendment prohibits.
C. The Stigma of Being Transgender
Unfortunately, inmates with gender dysphoria suffer from
the additional stigma of being transgender. As discussed in the
Introduction, transgender individuals are disproportionately
incarcerated as compared to the general public, and transgender
inmates are more likely to be victims of physical and sexual
assaults.
However, the discrimination that transgender
individuals face neither starts nor ends within the fenced premises
of correctional facilities. TGNC individuals are four-times more
likely to live in extreme poverty.
TGNC survey respondents also
experienced twice the rate of unemployment; 90% experienced
discrimination or harassment at work; 47% stated they
experienced adverse employment actions, such as termination;
16% felt compelled to work in illegal professions like drug dealing
or prostitution; and 26% reported losing a job due to being
TGNC.2 13 Unfortunately, the discrimination is no less intense in
K-12 education:
78% of TGNC individuals reported being
harassed; 35% reported being physically assaulted; 12% reported
being the victim of sexual violence; and 15% felt so severely
harassed that they discontinued their education.)4
TGNC
individuals also reported alarmingly high rates of housing

258. See id. at 106 (Thompson, J. dissenting). The district court found a clear
difference between treating the symptoms and treating the underlying disorder,
echoing the Seventh Circuit decision in Fields v. Smith. Kosilek II District Court,
89 F. Supp. 2d 190, 208 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 556
(7th Cir. 2011)), aff'd, 740 F.3d 733, 763 (1st Cir. 2014), rev'd en banc, 774 F.3d 63
(1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.). Additionally, physicians
from the Fenway Center testified that the preferred treatment plan should address
Kosilek's underlying disorder, GD, and not just her symptoms. Kosilek II En Banc,
774 F.3d at 106. Treating the underlying disorder is not, as MDOC argued on
appeal, the same as requiring treatment that cures the underlying disorder.
Kosilek IlFirst Circuit, 740 F.3d at 765.
259. Kosilek I[District Court, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
260. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.
262. GRANT ET AL., supra note 11, at 2 (defining extreme poverty as a household
income of less than $10,000 per year).
263. Id. at 3.
264. Id.
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discrimination: 19% were refused housing and 55% were harassed
by staff or residents of homeless shelters.265 Respondents also
reported
discrimination
and
harassment
in
public
accommodations266 and health care. 7
Given the high rates of discrimination and harassment
suffered by TGNC individuals both inside and outside of prison, it
is clear that even with the recent spotlight on transgender
individuals, public opinion has a long way to go. The current
attitude towards transgender individuals does not comport with
the "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency" embodied by the Eighth Amendment. 9
But change is coming, and it reflects "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. 2 70 Judge
Kayatta in his dissent stated:
[The district court's decision in Kosilek I] happens to produce
a result in this case that some of us find surprising, and much
of the public likely finds shocking. Scientific knowledge
advances quickly and without regard to settled norms and
arrangements. It sometimes draws in its wake a reluctant
community, unnerved by notions that challenge
our views of
271
who we are and how we fit into the universe.
Sometimes, law must be transformative and courts must be a
catalyst of change to our society's standards of decency. From
272
Brown v. Board of Education to United States v. Windsor 271
courts have advanced standards of human dignity where Congress
and the American public have faltered. Had the holding of the
three-judge First Circuit panel remained, the courts would have
again served as the protector of "dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency. 2 7'4 The First Circuit abdicated its duty to
protect the rights of all individuals in this nation by ignoring the

265. Id. at 4.
266. Id. at 5. Distressingly, 53% of respondents reported being disrespected at a
business or government agency. Id.
267. Id. at 6. Nineteen percent of TGNC individuals reported that they were
denied health care. Id. at 6.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
269. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
270. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
271. Kosilek II En Banc, 774 F.3d 63, 115 (1st Cir. 2014) (Kayatta, J.,
dissenting).
272. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
273. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
274. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th
Cir. 1968)).
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serious medical need of Kosilek and other inmates like her who
suffer from GD. However, as Judge Thompson stated in her
dissent:
I am confident that this decision will not stand the test of
time, ultimately being shelved with the likes of Plessy v.
Ferguson, deeming constitutional state laws requiring racial
segregation, and Korematsu v. United States, finding
constitutional the internment of Japanese-Americans in
camps during World War II. I only hope that day is not far in
the future, for the precedent the majority creates is
damaging.275
Conclusion
Chelsea Manning and Laverne Cox are shining a national
spotlight on transgender issues. Although transgender individuals
are traditionally an underprivileged group, targeted for
discrimination in all spheres of life, this heightened visibility
should lead to increased understanding of transgender issues and
to wider public acceptance. Out of sight, transgender inmates
continue to fight for adequate medical care and the treatments
necessary to treat their gender dysphoria. We have already seen
the result of treatment denials: attempted or successful selfcastration, and attempted suicide.276
Michelle Kosilek has
attempted both.277
Michelle Kosilek's fight for SRS highlights the underlying
issues with defining adequate medical treatment. In the First
Circuit, the medical services provided need only be "at a level
reasonably commensurate with modern medical science and of a
quality acceptable within prudent professional standards, 7' 8 and
only treatment "so inadequate as to shock the conscience" violates
the Eighth Amendment.2 7 9 But this standard permits a wide range
of treatments-a range further increased by Kosilek I
A
controversial underlying medical condition and a stigmatized
inmate further complicates the question of what constitutes
adequate treatment. Judges, like prison officials, are not medical
professionals. The First Circuit's decision in Kosilek II ignores the
wide spectrum of opinions inherent in medical diagnosis. While
the court noted that its decision "in no way suggests that

275. Kosilek liEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
276. See supra text accompanying note 81.
277. See supra text accompanying note 99.
278. United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987).
279. Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 235 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Sires v.
Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1987)).
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correctional administrators wishing to avoid treatment need
simply find a single practitioner willing to attest that some wellaccepted treatment is not necessary," it does appear to demand a
high level of consensus. 2" The majority of testifying physicians
asserted that SRS was medically necessary for Kosilek, but the
voice of the minority carried the day. At the very least, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals set a high bar for inmate petitioners to
establish that the medical care they received was inadequate.
Innovations constantly change what is possible in the field of
medicine. The First Circuit must clarify how it defines "adequate"
treatment and how judges can navigate the ever-changing tides of
medical science and professional standards.
Here, the First
Circuit gave little weight to the SOC, which are widely accepted
and used in treating GD. Instead, the majority focused on the
ability of physicians to craft individualized treatment plans under
the SOC. In doing so, it turned this flexibility into a gauge for
bare minimum treatment.
The First Circuit acknowledged but did not decide whether
adequate medical treatment must address the underlying medical
condition or must merely control the inmate's symptoms. Kosilek
11 suggests that the latter is sufficient; such a rule is consistent
with the circuit's "shock the conscience" test. 281 However, one must
ask whether this approach is in line with "the evolving standards2
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
Unfortunately, this is likely the end of Kosilek's legal battle for
adequate treatment; the Supreme Court denied her petition for
writ of certiorari on May 4, 2015.3
But the fight

280. Kosilek lHEn Banc, 774 F.3d at 90 n.12.
281. Torraco, 923 F.2d at 235 (quoting Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir.
1987)).
282. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see supra text accompanying notes
221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226,227, 228.
283. Kosilek v. O'Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.).
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continues for other transgender inmates. 2 8 4 As our standards of
decency evolve, we must reassess both how we treat prisoners and
how we determine how to treat prisoners. "When it comes to
human dignity, we cannot make compromises. 285

284. See, e.g., Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding
that an inmate's complaint was sufficient to state a claim where prison officials
allegedly violated the Eighth Amendment by denying her request for SRS);
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that a
transgender inmate had the right to access adequate medical care, including SRS).
In Norsworthy v. Beard, the inmate petitioner claimed that prison officials
violated the Eighth Amendment by denying her medically necessary SRS.
Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1175. The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction
and ordered prison officials to provide the inmate with medical care-including
SRS for her GD. Id. at 1194. Prison officials in Norsworthy presented many of
the same safety concerns as MDOC did in Kosilek, but the court found the concerns
unpersuasive. Id. at 1193. It is notable that the California correctional officials
hired Dr. Stephen Levine to review Norsworthy's case. Id. at 1194. The California
district court concluded that Dr. Levine was not credible in part because his report
misrepresented the SOC. Id. In particular, the district court took issue with Dr.
Levine's characterization of the SOC as requiring twelve months of real-life
experience in the community and the assertion that SRS is never a medically
required treatment, when both of those views are expressly contradicted by the
SOC. Id. at 1194-95. Lastly, the district court considered the fact that the other
expert hired by the correctional department was selected because he attended Dr.
Levine's training, which instructed participants that SRS is never an option for
incarcerated individuals. Id. at 1194.
285. Angela Merkel Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
authors/a/angela merkel.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).

